The causes and consequences of corruption have attracted much attention in recent years by both academics and policy makers. Central in the discussion on the impact of corruption are perception-based indices. Recent research has shown that perceived corruption might not be a good indicator of actual corruption in a country. In this paper, we employ a structural equation model-that treats corruption as a latent variable that is directly related to its underlying causes and effects-to derive an index of corruption. The index of corruption is derived for approximately 100 countries over the period 1976-97. Abstract: The causes and consequences of corruption have attracted much attention in recent years by both academics and policy makers. Central in the discussion on the impact of corruption are perception-based indices. Recent research has shown that perceived corruption might not be a good indicator of actual corruption in a country. In this paper, we employ a structural equation model-that treats corruption as a latent variable that is directly related to its underlying causes and effects-to derive an index of corruption. The index of corruption is derived for approximately 100 countries over the period 1976-97.
Introduction
Corruption around the world is believed to be endemic and pervasive, a significant contributor to low economic growth, to stifle investment, to inhibit the provision of public services and to increase inequality to such an extent that international organizations like the World Bank have identified corruption as 'the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development' (World Bank, 2001) .
1,2 More recently, the World Bank has estimated that more than US$ 1 trillion is paid in bribes each year and that countries that tackle corruption, improve governance and the rule of law could increase per capita incomes by a staggering 400 percent (World Bank, 2004) . Commensurate with the place of corruption on the policy agenda, the economics literature has paid increased attention to the issue. 3 Recently, there have been attempts to address the causes and consequences of corruption from an empirical standpoint. Notable efforts in this area include, among others, Mauro (1995) on the impact of corruption on economic growth and investment, Treisman (2000) on the causes of corruption, and Fisman and Gatti (2002) on the links between political structure and corruption.
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Corruption is a variable that cannot be measured directly. However, in recent years, several organizations have developed a corruption perception-based index across a wide range of countries to qualitatively assess the pervasiveness of corruption. These indices have been used in econometric studies (including those mentioned above) either as a dependent variable when exploring the causes of corruption or as an explanatory variable when investigating its consequences. Undoubtedly, these perception-based indices have made an important contribution to the understanding of the pervasiveness of corruption across countries. They are, however, not free of problems. One such problem refers to the fact that these indices do not relate directly to the factors that are responsible for causing 1 This argument is not supported unanimously. Routine corruption may have the desirable property of creating incentives for public employees. For an early statement of this argument, see Leff (1964) , Morgan (1964) and Lui (1985) . For a criticism of this view see Tanzi (1998) , Kaufmann and Wei (1999) and Rose-Ackerman (1999) . For recent empirical evidence, see Méon and Weill (2006) and Dreher and Gassebner (2007) . 2 The definition of corruption varies widely but the most widespread one seems to be the one provided by Klitgaard (1988) that emphasizes the deviation of public officials from formal duties. As Klitgaard notes, a corrupt official 'deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain private-regarding behavior,' p. 23. See also Rose-Ackerman (1999) .
corruption.
5 The consequence of this may be that the correlation between perceived corruption and actual corruption is low. Indeed, recent research has pointed precisely to this. According to Mocan (2004) perceived and actual corruption are completely unrelated once other relevant factors are controlled for. Similarly, Weber Abramo (2005) shows that perceived corruption is not related to bribery. Andvig (2005) and Weber Abramo (2005) consequently conclude that perception-based indices reflect the quality of a country's institutions rather than its actual degree of corruption. Svennson (2005) also highlights problems in the construction of perception-based indices while Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006) compare perception-based indices with direct surveys for six subSaharan African countries and conclude that the perception-based measures do not tie in with reality. Furthermore, according to the results of Bjørnskov (2006) , the six indices of governance (including a measure of perceived corruption) developed by cannot be separated statistically and, therefore, all measure one underlying governance factor.
It is clear, then, that the provision of a meaningful and comparable estimate of corruption across countries requires an alternative approach to the one usually taken. This paper deals with this issue. Recognizing that corruption is inherently a latent variable, and relying on the existing theory that identifies measurable variables that indicate and cause corruption, we employ a structural equation methodology to estimate the relationship between the manifest variables (causes and indicators) and the latent (corruption). 6 In particular, we estimate an index of corruption employing a special case of a structural equation model, the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model, introduced to economics by Weck (1983) , and Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) and latterly explored by Loayza (1996) , Giles (1999), and Schneider (2005) , among others, to measure the size of the hidden economy, 7 Raiser et al. (2000) to investigate the institutional change in Eastern Europe, and Kuklys (2004) to measure welfare.
Based on a sample of around 100 countries, we derive an index of corruption based on estimated parameters that relate directly to its causes and indicators. There are 5 They might also suffer from artificial 'inertia': once a country is reported to be corrupt, perception about this country may not change, leading future survey respondents to over-estimate true corruption. Other problems exist. See, for instance, Andvig et al. (2000) , Kaufmann et al. (2003) , and Søreide (2005) . 6 As will be seen later on, the estimated model does rely on one perception-based variable but this is unavoidable due to lack of appropriate data. Nevertheless, the structural dimension of the estimated model is preserved since this perception-based index is not the only determinant that is being used. We turn to this below.
two key advantages to this approach of measuring corruption. First, the ranking of countries in our index is firmly based on a structural relationship between causes and the variables that are known to be good proxies (indicators) of corruption. The selection of the variables are drawn from the existing literature on corruption. In this sense, the methodology is confirmatory in nature in that the structural model confirms (or otherwise) the role of the causal factors as determinants of corruption. Second, since we have, albeit limited, data on the causes and indicators of corruption dating back to the 1970s, we can re-estimate the model for different time periods allowing us to address the question of whether corruption has increased or decreased since the late 1970s. In addition, the index also has implications for empirical studies of corruption. As discussed later, the index provides not only an ordinal ranking of corruption across countries but it also, reflecting the nature of the data, provides a meaningful measure of 'distance' between countries in the corruption index.
The key results are as follows. The estimated model produces cross-countries indices (and so a ranking) of corruption based on the structural relationship between the variables that cause and indicate corruption from the mid-1970s to the late 1990's. The resulting ranking of countries is not surprising with the developed countries reported as having lower corruption than the developing ones. The estimates show that in 1997 Switzerland was the least corrupt country followed by Japan, Norway, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. The US is in 9 th position followed by France and Belgium. The most corrupt countries are (in reverse order) Zambia, Ghana, the Central Africa Republic, Syria, Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau, the most corrupt country.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the MIMIC methodology to measure corruption as a latent variable is presented. In Section 3, data on the causes and indicators of corruption are discussed. In Section 4, the results from the estimated MIMIC model and the index of corruption across countries are presented, while in Section 5 we provide some further discussion on (and the use of) the derived index. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude with some observations on the relevance of the results for further empirical research on corruption.
A structural equation model for corruption
We focus on the MIMIC model that is characterized by a latent endogenous variable with no measurement error in the independent variables. The unknown coefficients of the model are estimated separately through a set of structural equations with the indicator variables being used to capture the effect of the unobserved variables indirectly. Using causal and indicator variables of corruption across countries, the structural model can be estimated and, in turn, a cardinal index of corruption across countries retrieved.
More formally, but briefly, 8 the specification of the MIMIC model is as follows. Let y i , i = 1, . . . , n, be one of the indicators of the latent random variable corruption, denoted by η, such that:
where γ i is the factor loading 9 and u i , i = 1, . . . , n, are the error terms with mean zero and covariance matrix Θ u . The disturbances are mutually independent such that any correlation across the indicators are driven by the common factor η. Equation (1) is, then, a confirmatory factor analysis model for the observable indicators y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ′ with common factor η and unique factor u i , i = 1, . . . , n. The latent variable η is linearly determined by a set of exogenous variables (causes) given by x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ′ and a stochastic disturbance ǫ, that is:
where β = (β 1 , . . . , β k ) ′ . The model, therefore, comprises of two parts: the measurement model in equation (1) which specifies how the observed endogenous variables are determined by the latent variable and the structural equation model, equation (2), which specifies the relationship between the latent variable and its causes. 10 Since the latent variable η is unobserved, it is impossible to recover direct estimates of the structural parameters β. Substituting (2) into (1), the MIMIC model can be interpreted as a multivariate regression model that takes the reduced form, connecting the observable variables, given by:
where the reduced-form coefficient matrix is Π = γβ ′ , where γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) ′ , and the reduced-form disturbance vector is z = γǫ + u, with covariance matrix:
where σ 2 ǫ is the variance of the disturbance ǫ. Clearly, the rank of the reduced form regression matrix Π, in (3), is equal to 1. The error covariance matrix Θ ǫ , being the sum of a rank-one matrix and a diagonal matrix, is also similarly constrained. This property calls for a normalization of one of the elements of the vector γ to a pre-specified 8 See Jöreskog and Goldberg (1975) for the original contribution to estimating the MIMIC model with a single latent variable and Bollen (1989) for a more accessible, but thorough, treatment.
9 A factor loading represents the expected change in the respective indicators following a one unit change in the latent variable.
10 Figure 1 , presented in Section 3, provides a graphical representation of the system of simultaneous equations (path diagram) estimated in this paper.
value prior to the estimation of the reduced form of the model. The fundamental hypothesis for a structural equation model is that the covariance matrix of the observed variables, denoted by S, may be parameterized based upon a given model specification with parameter vector δ. The model parameters are estimated based upon minimizing the function:
where Σ −1 is the estimated population covariance matrix and ρ = k + n is the number of measured variables.
Once the hypothesized relationship between the variables has been identified and estimated, the latent variable scores η j for each country j = 1, . . . J can be obtained following the procedure suggested by Jöreskog (2000) . Intuitively, what the procedure behind the derivation of latent variable scores (and so of the ranking and indices of corruption) does is to calculate a score using the estimated coefficients for both the causal and indicator variables placing particular weights to the individual variables. In principle, the weight that each individual variable has is determined by minimizing an underlying objective function relating to the statistical properties of the sample data (specifically, the mean vector of the coefficients of the indicator variables and the covariance matrices across the random errors relating to both the indicator and causal variables), normally putting more weight on the indicator variables, as compared to the causal variables. 12 This process is not too dissimilar to standard uses of econometric models when used to derive a value for the dependent variable, the difference being that, in this case, the structural equation model uses the full information on causes and indicators and the dependent variable is an unobserved latent, which relates directly to the causes and indicators used to specify and estimate the model. The derived latent variable scores are, then, used to rank countries in terms of least to most corrupt and also provide a measure of distance between countries and, therefore, provide evidence of the extent of corruption across countries.
Clearly, then, the challenge in implementing this framework is to identify the relationship amongst the variables. This, together with data issues, is discussed in the following section.
3 Causes and indicators of corruption
Causes of corruption
To identify the hypothesized variables that relate to the causes and indicators of corruption, we draw extensively on the theoretical and empirical literature on this topic. We start with a discussion of the causal variables and then turn to the variables that have been used as indicators. To ease the exposition, the causal variables have been categorized into four main factor-groups namely: political and judicial factors; historical factors; social and cultural factors, and economic factors. 
Political factors
The political factors capture the democratic environment of a country, the effectiveness of its judicial system and the origin of its legal system. The role of an established democracy has been highlighted in several studies of corruption (see, among others, Treisman (2000), and Paldam (2003)). It is widely believed that corruption is related to the deficiencies of the political system and that an established democracy, by promoting political competition and hence increasing transparency and accountability, can provide a check, albeit an imperfect one, on corruption. Other characteristics of the political environment, including electoral rules (Persson et al. (2003) ) and the degree of decentralization (Treisman (2000) , and Fisman and Gatti (2002)) may also be important in explaining corruption.
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The judicial system is also expected to play a role in controlling corruption (Becker (1968) ). The role of the legal system and the rule of law have featured prominently in many recent studies on the quality of governance and its consequences for development (see, for example, North (1990) , and Easterly and Levine (1997) ). Strong legal foundations and efficient legal systems with well-specified deterrents protect property rights and so provide a stable framework for economic activity. Failure of the legal system to provide for the enforcement of contracts undermines the operation of the free market and, in turn, reduces the incentives for agents to participate in productive activities. But legal systems may differ in the degree to which property rights are protected and in the quality of government they provide. Empirical work suggests that the common law system, mostly found in the former colonies of Britain, appear to have better protection of property rights compared with the civil law system typically associated with the former colonies of continental Europe (see, for example, La Porta et al. (1999) ). Political instability may also matter for corruption, the expectation being that more unstable countries will have higher levels of perceived corruption. 
Historical factors
To a large extent, it is difficult to separate the historical factors from the political and judicial factors since the effectiveness of the judicial system is dependent on the colonial heritage of the country in question. La Porta et al. (1999) show that those countries that were former colonies of Britain and who adopted the common law system appear to have more effective judicial systems than those who adopted civil law systems associated with former colonies of continental European countries. Treisman (2000) also explores the direct influence of historical tradition on perceived corruption showing that former British colonies or dominions appear to reduce perceived corruption in excess of the role played by the common law system.
Social and cultural factors
This group of factors captures the social and cultural characteristics of a country that may impact upon the pervasiveness of corruption in a given country. For example, religion may shape social attitudes towards social hierarchy and family values and thus determine the acceptability, or otherwise, of corrupt practices. In more hierarchical systems (for example, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam), challenges to the status quo are less frequent than in more equalitarian or individualistic religions. The role of the religious tradition and corruption has been explored explicitly by Treisman (2000) who found that a Protestant tradition appears to have a negative (though small) effect on perceived corruption. Religion may also impact on the quality of the legal system, as explored by La Porta et al. (1999) . They found that countries with a high proportion of Catholics or Muslims reduces the quality of government and, by extension, may reduce the deterrence of corruption. Religious fractionalization may also have an impact on corruption and other characteristics associated with the quality of government (Alesina et al. (2003) ).
Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization of a society may also contribute to the pervasiveness of corruption in a given country. The evidence is, however, mixed. Treisman (2000) found no evidence that linguistic fractionalization had a direct impact on perceived corruption, while La Porta et al. (1999) found evidence that, in societies that were more ethno-linguistically diverse, governments exhibited inferior performance. More recently, Alesina et al. (2003) have presented evidence that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization has a statistically significant impact on corruption i.e., countries that are ethno-linguistically diverse are associated with higher perceived levels of corruption.
Economic factors
The economic determinants of corruption across countries have focussed typically on three factors: the degree of openness, a country's endowments of natural resources and the size of the public sector. Less open countries restrict trade and impose controls on capital flows. This creates rents and hence enhances the incentives to engage in corrupt activities. There are a number of papers that have investigated this issue: for example, Ades and Di Tella (1999) have shown that increased competition reduces corruption and that more open economies are less corrupt. Treisman (2000) has shown that higher imports lowers corruption. Wei and Wu (2001) have presented evidence that countries with capital controls have higher corruption and, in turn, receive less foreign investment and are more prone to financial crisis. More recently, Neeman et al. (2003) have shown that the effect of corruption on economic growth depends on the openness of the economy.
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Natural resource endowments have also featured in cross-country studies of corruption; the justification here being that the concentration of exports on natural resources is a proxy for rent-seeking opportunities. Ades and Di Tella (1999) suggest that corruption may offer greater gain to officials who exercise control over the distribution of the rights to exploit these natural resources. Treisman (2000) finds that a higher concentration of natural resource exports has a positive effect on perceived corruption.
Several studies on the causes of corruption have emphasised the size of the public sector. Tanzi (1998) , for instance, notes that the significant role of the public sector in the economy affords public officials some degree of discretion in the allocation of goods and services provided and hence increases the likelihood of corruption. This mechanism is reinforced if the wages public officials receive are relatively low. This issue is explored by van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) who find that low wages for civil servants have a statistically significant effect on (perceived) corruption. Treisman (2000) , however, finds rather inconclusive evidence of the size of the public sector in influencing corruption across countries.
We now turn to a discussion of the possible indicators of the structural model.
Indicators of corruption
As has been the case regarding the causal variables to be used as determinants of corruption, the existing literature offers sufficient guidance with respect to appropriate indicators. The challenge is to select variables that appear to be correlated with the pervasiveness of corruption across the countries on our sample. This, as emphasized above, will enable us to estimate the MIMIC model and retrieve a measure of the latent variable. While there are a large number of candidate variables, we report only those that were successful in our modeling effort.
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Naturally, the most obvious indicator variable that should be incorporated into the structural model is GDP per capita. Almost all available evidence would appear to suggest that corruption varies inversely with development (see, among others, Mauro (1995) and Paldam (2003) ). Capital control restrictions are also included as an indicator variable. As noted in the discussion above, countries less open to foreign trade appear to be correlated with high levels of corruption. 18 More specifically, recent studies have noted that countries appearing to exhibit relatively high levels of corruption are more likely to impose capital account restrictions (Wei and Wu (2001) and Dreher and Siemers (2005) ). Recent empirical studies on the consequences of corruption have also focused on the allocation of resources, emphasizing not only the negative impact of corruption on investment but also its negative impact on the composition of investment. Mauro (1997) argues that the allocation of public procurement contracts through a corrupt system will lead to lower quality public services and quality of infrastructure. 19 A natural variable that captures the distortion of corruption on the allocation of resources is a measure of financial development. One would expect, in the absence of a well-developed financial sector, that corruption would be particularly distorting relative to those countries where a highly developed financial sector is present. Along these lines, Hillman and Krausz (2004) argue that corruption provides the source of the ineffectiveness of the financial system by reducing the volume of financial intermediation. Following Claessens and Laeven (2003) , financial development is proxied by private credit as a share of GDP.
The final indicator variable uses apparent consumption of cement and endeavors to capture projects where the scope for corruption is high. As noted by Mauro (1997) Porta and Vannucci (1997) who note that per capita cement consumption in Italy (a country that is perceived to be high on corruption indices) has been double that of the US and triple that of the UK and Germany. It seems, therefore, that cement is a natural proxy for large-scale projects. Given this evidence and the results from the Bribe Payers Index, we collected data on total consumption of cement for all the countries in our sample. To account for the role of development, this consumption data was expressed as a percentage of GDP. In addition, to account for the distribution of the population, this data was also adjusted for the density of the population.
Results

Corruption 1991-1997
We initially estimated the model for the 1991-1997 period covering between 98 and 103 countries. 21 The time period was restricted to the cut-off year 1997 because of unavailability of more recent data for the causal and indicator variables. We took the mean values of the available data over this period. In estimating the model, we used data that relate directly to the causes of corruption outlined in the previous section. 22 Since we estimate the model over different sub-periods, we include only those variables where data was available from the 1970s to the 1990s. 23 For the political factors, we used the 20 As noted in footnote 17, military expenditure-being unavailable for the whole period-has not be included in the set of estimated variables. 21 All estimations have been performed with LISREL V. 8.5.4. 22 We tested each specification for multivariate normality. In those cases where transformations have been necessary, in order for the data to satisfy the multivariate normality assumption, the transformed data produced similar results.
23 Since the objective is to provide a model that would be comparable across sub-periods, variables with data available only for recent years, or a sub-set of countries, have been excluded.
following: whether the country was a democracy; the period of uninterrupted democratic government; number of years in office of the incumbent government; the rule of law; whether the political system was presidential; fractionalization of elected parties; whether the political system was federal; extent of decentralization; degree of political stability; freedom of the press and the school enrolment rate. The latter variable is used by Treisman (2000) who argues that corruption will be lower where populations are more educated and literate and where the normative separation between 'public' and 'private' is clearer. In a similar vein, Knack et al. (2003) suggest that education and literacy act as a vertical check on government. For social and cultural factors, we used data on:
the dominant religion in each country; the extent of religious fractionalization; whether English was the dominant language; the degree of linguistic fractionalization and ethnic fractionalization. Historical causes included the following: legal origin; whether the country is a former colony of Britain; whether a common or civil law system applies; settler mortality and latitude. Variables used to capture the economic causes of corruption included: trade as a percentage of GDP; natural resource exports as a percentage of merchandize exports and the size of the public sector.
Making use of these variables, a number of specifications have been tested. The approach followed is the general to specific. Where variables were insignificant at the 10 per cent level or above, they have been excluded from the model. Since the structural equation modeling is confirmatory in nature, this is an acceptable practice. In what follows, discussion is confined to those variables which are statistically significant at conventional levels. Figure 1 presents the hypothesized set of relationships that link the variable of interest, corruption, to the indicators and causes.
24 These constructs predict the measured variable (corruption). The implication is that corruption is indicated by the country's cement consumption, private credit, GDP per capita and capital restrictions. The latent variable of corruption is also predicated by a series of causal variables namely, the rule of law, school enrolment, latitude, legal German origin and the age of democracy. The model is then estimated to derive the values of the estimated parameters that link both the causes and indicators to the latent variable.
Insert Figure 1 here.
Before reporting the results, one should draw attention to the issue of separating causes from indicators. All models presented below employ the causal and indicator variables with their contemporaneous values. Clearly, this might give rise to endogeneity or reverse causality issues. Some of the causal variables can equally plausibly be used as indicators, and vice versa. As the MIMIC method is confirmatory in nature, it is inevitable we decide upon a model that can be accepted or rejected a priori. In those cases where the literature is indecisive about whether a variable is a cause or an indicator, we used the variable either way to test for the robustness of our results. As it turns out, the results are rather robust to exchanging causal and indicator variables. We also tried lagging the quantitative causal variables by one period to deal with potential endogeneity. Again, the results are not qualitatively affected by this.
The results are presented in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 here.
Starting with the indicator variables, it can be seen that they are fairly consistent across all model specifications. As pointed out in Section 2, one of the coefficients of the indicators must be normalized for the estimated parameters to be identified. The choice of the indicator variable on which to normalize the latent variable is to some extent arbitrary.
However, while the choice of indicator fixes the scale of the latent variable, the choice does not affect the qualitative results (Stapleton, 1978) . We choose cement consumption for normalization as, theoretically, it is closely (and ideally directly) related to the underlying concept of corruption. All indicator variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and have the anticipated sign, with cement consumption being positively and financial development negatively related to corruption, respectively. Lower levels of GDP per capita and more restrictions on the capital account are also associated with higher corruption.
Turning to the causal variables, the results show that the rule of law has a negative effect on corruption that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level across all specifications.
School enrolment, too, reduces corruption and so-recalling that school enrolment can be interpreted as a proxy for the effectiveness of democracy in a given country-countries with weak democratic institutions will be expected to have higher levels of corruption. This coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level in the specifications reported in columns 1 and 2, while it is significant at the 5 percent level in specifications 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 4 include latitude (a variable with ambiguous economic interpretation).
At the 10 percent level of significance, latitude reduces corruption. Columns 2 and 4 also include a dummy for German legal origin, while the age of democracy is included in columns 3 and 4. Both variables negatively affect corruption at the 5 percent level of significance.
25
25 When including non-continuous variables, the estimator is no longer consistent, Bollen (1989 
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The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) accounts for the error of approximation in the population and has recently been recognized as one of the most informative criteria in covariance structure modelling (Steiger, 1990 The next step is to derive the ranking for the countries in the sample in terms of their expected levels of corruption. The method of proceeding from the estimated parameters to the derivation of the index was outlined in Section 2. Specifically, the estimated parameters together with the observations for the country-specific causes and indicators however, does not seem to impose any problems here. The results are very similar when legal German origin is excluded from estimation. Note that the index of restrictions is continuous due to averaging and standardizing.
26 These standardized coefficients are defined asγ s ij =γ ij σ jj /σ ii , andβ s ij =β ij σ jj /σ ii where the subscript s denotes the standardized coefficient, i is the 'dependent' variable, j is the 'independent' and σ jj , √σ ii are the model-predicted variances of the j th and i th variables, respectively.
27 The chi-square statistic tests the specification of the model against the alternative that the covariance matrix of the observed variables is unconstrained, where smaller values indicate a better fit. In other words, a small chi-square does not reject the null hypothesis that the model reproduces the covariance matrix.
28 Expressed differently, the RMSEA measures how well the model fits based on the difference between the estimated and the actual covariance matrix (and degrees of freedom). Values of the RMSEA less than 0.05 indicate good fit, values as high as 0.08 represent reasonable fit, values from 0.08 to 0.10 indicate mediocre fit, and those greater than 0.10 indicate poor fit (MacCallum et al. 1996) . are used to derive the latent scores and, in turn, the values for the index across the countries in our sample. 30 The results for the final model are reported in the first column of Table 2 , where the parentheses contain the index.
Insert Table 2 here.
The ranking, to a large extent, is not surprising, the developed countries being typically reported as countries with lower corruption and developing countries with higher corruption. The world's least corrupt country is Switzerland, followed by Japan, Norway, In what follows, we will explore the developments of these patterns over time.
Corruption 1976-1997
We now explore how corruption has changed over time since 1976. However, in doing this, there are several drawbacks. First, the further back in time, the less data there is available in terms of country coverage. For each sub-time period the model is estimated, the sample size reduces considerably (for the periods 1986-1990, 1981-1985 and 1976-1980 the sample reduces to 91, 77 and 65 countries, respectively). The second issue relates to the countries we lose from the sample; typically those countries for which data is absent will be the less developed ones where corruption may be expected to be high.
31
30 In the economics literature the normalized coefficients are sometimes multiplied by the corresponding (standardized) data to derive an estimate of the latent variable, (Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) , and Loayza (1996) ). The results reported are robust to this procedure. As noted earlier, we have opted to use the methodology of Jöreskog (2000) which uses more structural information.
In this case, it is likely that the estimated model will give less statistically significant coefficients for the earlier periods.
To deal with these issues, the basic specification of the model included all causal variables discussed in Section 3. However, for different time periods, not all variables were statistically significant. Therefore, to provide consistency in our specification across sub-periods, we estimate a more parsimonious version of the model to the one that was presented in Table 1 .
32 In choosing the most parsimonious version of the model, we relied on the variables that would be statistically significant across all time periods and the goodness-of-fit statistics. While all the indicator variables continued to perform well, the number of statistically significant causes was reduced to two: the rule of law and the school enrolment rate. The results for the estimation of the model for each sub-period (including the 1991-97 period) are presented in columns 2-4 of Table 3 .
Insert Table 3 here.
The estimated parameters for both the causal and indicator variables are fairly consistent across each sub-period. The signs of the estimated parameters continue to hold (as in the less parsimonious model for 1991-1997 presented in Table 2 ) while the parameter values show little variation. Table 3 also reports goodness-of-fit statistics for our four models. The chi-square test of exact fit accepts all models at least at the five percent level of significance. The RMSEA is smaller than 0.05 in the most recent period and still acceptable in the other three specifications. The other indices that provide evidence of model fit (the GFI, the AGFI and the NFI), all indicate values relatively close to 1. Based on these goodness-of-fit statistics, we conclude that our model fits the sample data fairly well when estimated for each sub-period.
The indices of corruption derived from those estimates are presented in the last four columns of Table 2 . There are two important results. First, levels of corruption seem to be fairly consistent over time, as are the relative positions of countries. 33 Second, there are some obvious regional patterns. Overall, corruption in Western Europe decreased since the mid-70s, whereas corruption increased in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America/Caribbean. The pattern is more mixed in East Asia Pacific, where the huge decrease in Japan's level of corruption reduces the average level for the region, and the Middle account restrictions are not available for earlier periods. This is because Switzerland only became a member of the IMF in 1992.
32 Note that for the most recent period, the correlation between the full and the parsimonious model is 0.998. The quality of our results is thus not reduced by estimating a more parsimonious model. 33 In interpreting the ranking one has to keep in mind that in many cases a country moves up or down in the ranking because of missing data for other countries.
East/North Africa, with decreases in corruption in Israel and Malta and increases in most other countries. The averages for the period 1976-1980 are -0.13 (West Europe), -0.01 (East Asia Pacific), 0.05 (Middle East and North Africa), 0.7 (Latin America and Caribbean), 0.1 (sub-Saharan Africa) and 0.1 (South Asia). It is also worth noting that, of the 10 most corrupt countries reported in Table 2 , all witnessed an increase in corruption since the 1980s.
Comparing our results for the full model over the period 1991-97 with the 1997 corruption perception-based index produced by Transparency International, five of the countries shown to be among the worlds ten least corrupt countries according to our index, also appear among the first ten countries in the Transparency International index. No country of our ten least corrupt countries ranks below 21 in the Transparency International's listing. In spite of the high correlation, and the overall consistency, there are some interesting discrepancies. As one example, Chile ranks 37 according to our index, while Transparency International's ranking shows it to be 23. Given the different interpretations of the indices, Chile is thus perceived to be less corrupt as it actually is.
Further discussion
This study was predicated on the fact that perception-based indices of corruption have recently been criticized as potentially biased and inaccurate measures of corruption across countries, but are nevertheless widely used in the empirical literature on corruption due to their availability, their extensive country coverage and lack of alternative measures. As discussed in the introduction, those indices may not be reliable indicators of the degree of corruption. Instead, they may just reflect a general perception of a country's institutional quality. In this paper, we have addressed these potential shortcomings while retaining the advantages of cross-country coverage by employing a structural equation model that addresses many of the concerns raised with respect to the survey-based indices.
Of course, one may argue that the estimated model does not capture the extent of corruption. There are three ways to test for the validity of a structural model (Bollen, 1989) .
Firstly, it is necessary to examine the fit of the model. Secondly, variables related to the latent variable in the theoretical literature should have the expected impact. We have dealt with these two validity tests above. Thirdly, the obtained latent variable should be correlated with other measures of the same concept. We, therefore, calculated the correlation of the resulting indices with the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International (which is highly correlated with other perception-based indices). As Appendix Table A1 shows, the resulting Spearman rank correlations for the respective time periods range from 0.79 for the period 1991-97 to 0.85 in 1986-90. 34 Overall, we can be reasonably confident that our latent variable is picking up the ranking of corruption across countries.
Arguably, reflecting the nature of the data, the index derived in this paper is likely to be more appropriate to use in studies that evaluate the impact of corruption than are perception-based indices. There are two important aspects to this. First, since the index not only derives the rank but also the distance between countries in the corruption index, this has the potential to give a more accurate (or less biased) estimate of how the impact of corruption varies across countries and hence the dependent variable of interest. Second, since the index is derived on country fundamentals that vary over time, the ranking and the distance between countries can also vary over time. Moreover, the time aspect has the potential to deal with any endogeneity issues between corruption and the dependent variable since the lagged values of the corruption index may be exogenous to current fundamentals.
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The use of the index may also provide a different assessment of the likely impact of corruption to the one produced by perception-based indices. 36 Indeed, a simple example illustrates this point. Assessing the dependence of international cross-border acquisitions (the main form of foreign direct investment) on the quality of institutions using Transparency International's perception-based index, for the US and OECD as host countries and for the years 1997-2003, we found a substantial overestimation of the impact of corruption on cross border mergers and acquisitions. More specifically, using the perception-based corruption index of Transparency International, the absolute value of the estimated standardized (beta-) coefficient is 0.16 which is substantially larger than the estimated coefficient of 0.02 produced when using the corruption index reported in this paper.
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Taken together, the corruption index based on the structural equation approach is likely to be of direct consequence to different user groups. One such group is the policy-based academic community which endeavor to evaluate the consequences of corruption. Since 34 Table A1 also reports the correlation between the latent variables and the causal and indicator variables used. As can be seen, correlations between the latent variable and the indicators varies from about 0.5-0.95. 35 This is a well accepted procedure in the shadow economy literature. 36 This feature comes from the fact that the derived index provides a ranking between countries but also a measure of distance. As such, it has the potential to more accurately estimate the impact of corruption on variables such as foreign direct investment. 37 We make use of the index produced in Table 2 for the years 1991-1997 and the corruption perceptionbased index of Transparency International. The details are available upon request. The same pattern emerges in the study of electoral competition and corruption, Herger (2005) . the measure derived here gives a measure of distance as well as ranking of corruption across countries, it therefore has the potential to provide more reliable estimates of the impact of corruption than perception-based indices which provide the ranking but not the distance. As such, perception-based measures may provide biased estimates (as we note above). For various international or private sector organizations and non-government organizations who make decisions based on the institutional environment of a particular country (e.g., the disbursement of aid or investment), the methodology for deriving an index outlined here would also be potentially useful. The main advantage for this constituent user is that it can monitor how corruption in a particular country varies over time. Even if the ranking of the country in the corruption index stays the same, this does not necessarily imply that corruption is not being controlled. Moreover, since the perception-based indices have an in-built bias insofar as perceptions may change little over time, countries may be denied aid and investment despite efforts to control corruption. Since the method outlined here is based on measurable causes and indicators that vary over time, this allows a country's measured performance in controlling corruption to improve.
Clearly, the MIMIC method of structural equation modeling as applied here is only an additional step in furthering our understanding about corruption. Generally, there is considerable scope for using the structural equation methodology to explore broader aspects of institutional governance and how it is linked to corruption. For example, Glaeser et al. (2004) and Rodrik et al. (2004) have argued that conventionally-used measures of institutional quality such as the rule of law are perception-based outcome measures that do not necessarily pick up the quality of governance that they purport to do. In this sense, applying the above methodology to measure institutional quality as a latent variable with appropriate causes and indicators could be fruitful. In addition, as already touched upon, the incidence of corruption may interact with measures of institutional quality such that there is a potential endogeneity issue: corruption may be high due to weak institutions, though the institutions may be weak because corruption is so pervasive. The structural equation methodology has the potential to account for this.
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Concluding remarks
Current policy focus on corruption around the world, as well as most empirical studies of corruption, employ perception-based indices to gauge the ranking between the most and less corrupt countries. The recent literature has revealed several problems in the interpretation of these indices. To this end, we employed a structural model of corruption that simultaneously deals with the causes and indicators of corruption within a unified framework.
There are clear advantages to using this framework to estimating corruption. First, the model is explicitly causal in nature such that the ranking one retrieves across countries is tied to the causal variables that were used to estimate the model. As such, the model produces a cardinal index of corruption rather than one that is solely ordinal. Secondly, dependent on data availability, the model can be estimated over different sub-periods to assess how corruption has changed over time for each country.
The methodology applied in this paper holds much promise for future research in the empirical analysis of corruption. For example, the impact of economic, political and economic reform on corruption is a potentially fruitful avenue of research and one that has received some attention for those who identify the role of institutions as a determinant of economic development (Acemolgu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2002) ).
Moreover, the methodology reported here can be extended to the case where some of the exogenous variables are themselves inherently latent and interrelated (for example, with institutional reform, the rule of law and the hidden economy) which interact with the endogenous latent variable of corruption. For example, in measuring the size of the hidden economy which has been a previous focus of researchers using MIMIC, the estimates are likely to be picking up aspects of corruption (and vice versa). Separating these two aspects will provide a more accurate assessment of the relative importance of each of them. Table A1 Spearman rank correlations 1991-97 1991-97p 1986-90p 1981-85p 1976- Tables   Table 1: Estimates of corruption for 1991-1997.
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